Masks will fall off: Higher-order optimal distinguishers

Nicolas Bruneau 1, 2 Sylvain Guilley 1, 2 Annelie Heuser 3, 2 Olivier Rioul 3, 2
1 SSH - Secure and Safe Hardware
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
3 COMNUM - Communications Numériques
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
Abstract :

Higher-order side-channel attacks are able to break the secu- rity of cryptographic implementations even if they are protected with masking countermeasures. In this paper, we derive the best possible distinguishers (High-Order Optimal Distinguishers or HOOD) against masking schemes under the assumption that the attacker can profile. Our exact derivation admits simple approximate expressions for high and low noise and shows to which extent the optimal distinguishers reduce to known attacks in the case where no profiling is possible. From these results, we can explain theoretically the empirical outcome of recent works on second-order distinguishers. In addition, we extend our analysis to any order and to the application to masked tables precomputation. Our results give some insight on which distinguishers have to be considered in the security analysis of cryptographic devices.

Complete list of metadatas

https://hal.telecom-paristech.fr/hal-02287072
Contributor : Telecomparis Hal <>
Submitted on : Friday, September 13, 2019 - 4:32:55 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:37:03 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02287072, version 1

Citation

Nicolas Bruneau, Sylvain Guilley, Annelie Heuser, Olivier Rioul. Masks will fall off: Higher-order optimal distinguishers. International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (AsiaCrypt), Dec 2014, Kaoshiung, Taiwan. pp.344-365. ⟨hal-02287072⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

9