Template attacks with partial profiles and Dirichlet priors: Application to timing attacks

Eloi De Cherisey 1, 2 Sylvain Guilley 2, 1, 3 Olivier Rioul 4, 1 Darshana Jayasinghe
2 SSH - Secure and Safe Hardware
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
4 COMNUM - Communications Numériques
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
Abstract : In order to retrieve the secret key in a side-channel attack, the attacker computes distinguisher values using all the available data. A profiling stage is very useful to provide some a priori information about the leakage model. However, profiling is essentially empirical and may not be exhaustive. Therefore, during the attack, the attacker may come up on previously unseen data, which can be troublesome. A lazy workaround is to ignore all such novel observations altogether. In this paper, we show that this is not optimal and can be avoided. Our proposed techniques eventually improve the performance of classical information-theoretic distinguishers in terms of success rate.
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https://hal.telecom-paristech.fr/hal-02300026
Contributor : Olivier Rioul <>
Submitted on : Sunday, September 29, 2019 - 11:32:40 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:37:03 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02300026, version 1

Citation

Eloi De Cherisey, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul, Darshana Jayasinghe. Template attacks with partial profiles and Dirichlet priors: Application to timing attacks. Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP 2016), Jun 2016, Seoul, South Korea. ⟨hal-02300026⟩

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