An information-theoretic model for side-channel attacks in embedded hardware

Eloi De Cherisey 1, 2 Sylvain Guilley 2, 1, 3 Olivier Rioul 4, 1 Pablo Piantanida 5
2 SSH - Secure and Safe Hardware
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
4 COMNUM - Communications Numériques
LTCI - Laboratoire Traitement et Communication de l'Information
Abstract : Using information-theoretic tools, this paper estab- lishes a mathematical link between the probability of success of a side-channel attack and the minimum number of queries to reach a given success rate, valid for any possible distinguishing rule and with the best possible knowledge on the attacker’s side. This link is a lower bound on the number of queries, which depends on the mutual information between the traces and the secret key. This leads us to derive upper bounds on the mutual information that are as tight as possible and can be easily calculated. It turns out that, in the case of additive white Gaussian noise, the bound on the probability of success of any attack is directly related to the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This leads to easy computations and predictions of the success rate for any leakage model.
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https://hal.telecom-paristech.fr/hal-02300788
Contributor : Olivier Rioul <>
Submitted on : Sunday, September 29, 2019 - 9:04:36 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, October 17, 2019 - 12:37:03 PM

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  • HAL Id : hal-02300788, version 1

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Eloi De Cherisey, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul, Pablo Piantanida. An information-theoretic model for side-channel attacks in embedded hardware. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT 2019), Jul 2019, Paris, France. ⟨hal-02300788⟩

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