Template attacks with partial profiles and Dirichlet priors: Application to timing attacks

Abstract :

In order to retrieve the secret key in a side-channel attack, the attacker computes distinguisher values using all the available data. A profiling stage is very useful to provide some a priori information about the leakage model. However, profiling is essentially empirical and may not be exhaustive. Therefore, during the attack, the attacker may come up on previously unseen data, which can be troublesome. A lazy workaround is to ignore all such novel observations altogether. In this paper, we show that this is not optimal and can be avoided. Our proposed techniques eventually improve the performance of classical information-theoretic distinguishers in terms of success rate.

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https://hal.telecom-paristech.fr/hal-02412482
Contributor : Telecomparis Hal <>
Submitted on : Sunday, December 15, 2019 - 3:05:13 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 8, 2020 - 1:05:55 AM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-02412482, version 1

Citation

Eloi de Chérisey, Sylvain Guilley, Olivier Rioul, Darshana Jayasinghe. Template attacks with partial profiles and Dirichlet priors: Application to timing attacks. Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP 2016), Jun 2016, Seoul, South Korea. ⟨hal-02412482⟩

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